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Ribot. (*Apathiques—Affectifs—Intellectuels—Actifs—Tempérés—Volontaires.*) As will be readily seen, the author does not assume the responsibility of giving the preference in classification either to sensitiveness, or to intelligence, or to will. Consequently he presents a mixture void of all unity. Perhaps, when we shall have arrived at a better and more thorough knowledge of the essence of these three faculties, we shall be able to decide. As far as one can judge now, it seems to me that intelligence should be considered the leading faculty. The fact alone, that, except when one has phenomena entirely automatic to deal with, the intellectual element is never wanting, while the elements of sensitiveness and of will are very often completely absent, would constitute a strong argument in favor of intelligence.

Third Part. In the fifty last pages of the book, we have the theories of formation and development of character which we have just studied in its broadest and most many-sided manifestations. I only mention the fact that in the problem of the influence of will, Mr. Malapert finally takes his place among the Neo-Criticists, and especially he shares the view of Mr. Renouvier. This does not seem to me to be a very valuable feature of the book. The "formula" the author arrives at in his conclusion: "It is the duty of every one to have a character" (*Le devoir pour chacun, c'est d'avoir du caractère*), is in fact nothing but words. However, the book loses none of its value on account of this; it is the best means of becoming acquainted with the present state of researches in this very important chapter of psychology.

A. SCHINZ, PH. D.

(71) *Essai sur l'obligation morale.* By GEORGE FULLIQUET. Alcan, Paris, 1898, pp. 450.

Mr. Fulliquet is an author who became celebrated some years ago by his book, "La pensée religieuse dans le Nouveau Testament." I can but regret that he has abandoned the field of theological studies as well as the field of historical researches, for in both kinds of work he is a man who can do much towards the advancement of science. His "Essai sur l'obligation morale" is a new assertion (exactly as the book of the Abbé Piat, which will also be reviewed in this number of the JOURNAL) of ancient philosophy in opposition to recent theories to-day prevalent in Ethics. Mr. Fulliquet has many qualities in common with old philosophers; among others prolixity (his essay consists of no less than 450 large sized pages) and a great talent for repeating well-known ideas, and even ideas he himself has already developed in other parts of his book. I admit that the author has a great talent of exposition and a very good style. I admit, also, that his way of argumentation is in general on a higher level than that of the Catholic author I spoke of. I admit especially that his intentions are excellent; but I do not admit that such philosophical publications are of any value. It is beautiful; it is elegant; it is sincere; it is generous—in a word it shows the spirit of the metaphysical publications in France, but it is not scientific. Besides, in spite of all his efforts, the author does not do justice to the philosophy of to-day. If he himself recognizes that the theory of "Libertas Indifferentiae," with the so-called Ass of Buridan, was proposed before Aristoteles, and if, on the other hand, the scientists are not willing to accept it, there must certainly be some very good reason for it. And if even they should decidedly be wrong, then the partisans of liberty must have other arguments to offer than such as have been proposed over and over again, and which have proved unable to compel silence among determinists. Every one knows that the partisans of liberty affirm

that determinism does not account for all phenomena in our life, and consequently it is unnecessary to have a very long discussion upon all those arguments familiar to philosophers; why insist so haughtily upon the influence of the idea of liberty, conscience of liberty, duty? etc. Even the step from moral obligation to the idea of God (which is here, I must say, clearer and brighter formulated than anywhere else, as far as I know) is not new to anybody. And still the same as for a possibility of liberty on account of the free choice between two determined possibilites, this theory exposed not only by Prof. James, whom the author quotes, but by quite a number of philosophers centuries ago.

Another point is that Mr. Fulliquet has no right to say that any philosopher has ever refused to admit the existence of moral obligation; some only refused to admit that the origin of this obligation has to be looked for in a transcendental world, or simply outside of the world, and of the chain of causes and effects—that is quite different.

Finally: Mr. Fulliquet distinguishes two kinds of obligations: (1) the moral obligation, and (2) the obligations by egotism, by intelligence, by association, by the ideal, and so forth,—and he concludes therefrom: the obligations of the second kind being not liable to be conceived in the same way as moral obligation, they are not really obligations at all. Now, would it not be possible, and for reasons just as good, if not better, to say: If moral obligation in the sense of Mr. Fulliquet is not liable to be conceived like the other obligations *for which we have a rational explanation*, it is not really an obligation in the sense we can give to this word in the ordinary—the rational—way of speaking.

As for the substitution of an “unconscious ego” as the creator of free acts, in the place of an “intelligible ego” with Kant, it seems to me rather a difference of words than of notion.

It is of no special interest to speak here of the history of ethics, that is, the exposition of some systems of ethics in this century (Kant, Schopenhauer, Mr. Renouvier, H. Spencer, Ch. Sécrétan, Mr. Fouillée, Guyau). This part of the book also offers nothing new: there have been very able publications of this kind before the one by Mr. Fulliquet.

I wish to say, in closing, that most of the above criticism applies not only to Mr. Fulliquet's book, but to all those—so numerous to-day—which take up well-known problems in an antiquated way.

A. SCHINZ, PH. D.

(72) *Essai sur les conditions et les limites de la certitude logique.*

By G. MILHAUD. 2^e édition revue. Alcan, Paris, 1898.

The author belongs to the class of thinkers who are gradually taking the place of the French “Spiritualistes” followers of Cousin. Their most important representative is Mr. Boutroux. The book, “*De la certitude logique*,” belongs to the same category as “*De la contingence des lois de la nature*,” by Boutroux, and the “*Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience*,” by Bergson. All of them agree with modern science and its methods; even the neo-Kantian school of Renonvier does not satisfy their wants of exactitude. On the other hand, however, they try to escape from the results of the new science, and they elaborate their theories on the basis of the science of Logic.

The most evident principle of science is the principle of contradiction; and it is this very first principle, the consequence of which Mr. Milhaud attacks sharply, as soon as these consequences are applied outside a certain field of speculation. He distinguishes